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Prime Minister Abe at a TICAD IV Event in Tokyo last year with African leaders
Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe addresses attendees, including top African leaders, of the seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development, held in August 2019.

 

Under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan has taken a much more significant interest in African affairs. This has primarily focused on economic development, but also geopolitics, at times with a commitment to work with India to counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

The seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), held in August 2019, provided a window into Japan’s policies in Africa. The event was designed in part to help Japanese companies (and their government) to position themselves in Africa, where rival China’s influence is well established. The Japanese welcomed some of Africa’s most prominent leaders, including South African president Cyril Ramaphosa and Rwandan president Paul Kagame.

Japan pledged to some US$30 billion in public and private investment over three years at the 2016 edition of TICAD. Yet, this has often been spent prudently—such as a US$94 million doled out to renovate a Kenyan geothermal plant.

The 2019 event ended with Japan promising some US$20 billion in private sector investment over three years.

“If partner countries are deeply in debt, it interferes with everyone’s effort to enter the market,” said Abe at the event. Elsewhere, his comments on sustainability of engagement in Africa offered veiled swipes at China’s role in Africa.

Despite being the fourth-largest spender on development aid in Africa, Japanese trade with the African Union has been much slower to develop. Indeed, Japan’s trade with Africa in 2017 was worth US$17 billion, less than half of what it was in 2008. Meanwhile, China conducted some US$204 billion in trade with Africa in 2018 alone. However, other metrics tell a different tale there were some 800 Japanese competes in Africa in 2018 as compared to just 250 in 2010.

One possible reason Japan is treading cautiously in Africa is that it likes to avoid moving unilaterally and may be seeking to work more closely with partners in Africa.

Of potential partners for engagement with Africa for Japan, the most important may be that other large Asian democracy which is concerned about the rise of China – India.

Japan and India were the two main drivers behind the launch in 2017 of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which is often touted as an alternative to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Bangladesh, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Zambia, and Zimbabwe all became members of the project.

Yet, three years later, little has come of the effort, and a frustrated Japan may refocus on its vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, a vision announced in Kenya by Prime Minister Abe in 2016 at the TICAD VI summit.  

 

Madagascar's President Hery Rajaonarimampianina (L) shakes hands with Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the start of talks at the latter's official residence in Tokyo on December 5, 2017
Hery Rajaonarimampianina, former president of Madagascar, and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe shake hands at the start of talks at the latter’s official residence in Tokyo on December 5, 2017.

 

Japan’s plan to help Madagascar build a port at the outer edge of the Indo-Pacific region suggests how seriously Japan is committed to the plan. 

Japan envisions several economic corridors: a West African Growth ring to connect the Ivory Coast, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Ghana; an East African route to connect Kenya’s Mombasa with Uganda (which is likely in keeping with IGAD’s infrastructure corridor plans); and the Nacala Corridor which will run through the Southern African countries of Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique (in order to export coal to Japan).   

On the security front, Japan is well ahead of potential partner India in developing ties with the continent. India held its first defense exercise with seventeen African nations last year. Japan, conversely, has built its first overseas military base since World War II in Djibouti, and spent funds to help stabilize northern Nigeria.

These commitments have not come without risks. In 2017, Japan was forced to withdraw its 350-man peacekeeping contingent based in Juba, South Sudan, after its deployment caused controversy in Japan due to the ongoing South Sudanese Civil War. That same year, a Chinese official newspaper reported that a Japanese naval ship had sent scuba divers to approach a Chinese warship while both ships were docked in a Djibouti harbor.

“Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous,” said Prime Minister Abe at the opening session of TICAD VI.

 

 

Undersea Cable

 

A multinational consortium of telecommunications companies—including Facebook, China Mobile International, MTN Global Connect, Telecom Egypt, and Vodafone—announced the construction of a new undersea fiber-optic cable that will connect sixteen African countries, Europe, and the Middle East. Named 2Africa, the 37,000 kilometer-long communications cable is scheduled to go live in 2023 or 2024.

 

Africans pay some of the highest data rates in the world.

 

In March, two undersea cables serving Africa experienced breakages that drastically reduced Internet connectivity for days as repairs were made. The addition of 2Africa will help improve Internet access for millions of Africans, and mitigate disruptions should other cables experience failures in the future. Such disruptions are not only frustrating for Africans, who pay some of the highest data rates in the world, but also have a negative impact on the African economy.

A 2017 report by the Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) concluded that intentional Internet shutdowns in twelve countries between 2015 and 2017 cost sub-Saharan Africa more than US$237 million. Unforeseen connectivity disruptions naturally can have far greater negative impact on national and regional economies.

 

 

Africom General
General Thomas Waldhauser was the commander of the United States Africa Command until his retirement in July 2019, when General Stephen J. Townsend assumed the command.

 

Conventional reporting on the United States military’s presence in Africa has suggested a potential troop drawdown, an option that has been floated for months now by US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. But internal documents of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) obtained by the Mail & Guardian indicate planned upgrades to and renovations of American bases in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, all of which are expected to be carried out between 2021 and 2025.

The documents, formally issued in October 2018, discuss twelve construction projects for American bases in Kenya, Niger, and Djibouti. All told, this construction is slated to cost upwards of US$330 million, the majority of which has been set aside for seven projects specifically for Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. Formerly a French Foreign Legion outpost, Camp Lemonnier is the headquarters of the United States’ Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa; it is also the central node in AFRICOM’s counterterrorism operations in neighboring Somalia and Yemen, and hosts 4,000 of the 6,000 American troops stationed in Africa.

 

The uncertainty posed by the COVID-19 pandemic could change how future operations are handled.

 

At the very least, it appears that US troop presence in Africa will remain for the foreseeable future, though the uncertainty posed by the COVID-19 pandemic could change how future operations are handled. Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti recently went into lockdown after two contractors working on-site were diagnosed with COVID-19.

 

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Jul 11, 2020