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In 2019, Kampala police procured $126 million worth of closed circuit television camera (CCTV) surveillance technology from Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei to help control the city’s growing crime problem. Opposition and civil society leaders contend that the surveillance cameras, which rely on facial recognition technology, will be used instead to track and target government critics. This concern appears justified as an independent investigation has found that Ugandan intelligence officials are using the technology to crack the encrypted communications of popular singer and opposition leader Bobi Wine.

African Countries That Have Deployed Surveillance Technology

  • Algeria
  • Botswana
  • Côte d’Ivoire
  • Egypt
  • Ghana
  • Malawi
  • Nigeria
  • Rwanda
  • South Africa
  • Tanzania
  • Uganda
  • Zambia
  • Zimbabwe

Similar concerns have emerged across the continent as over a dozen African countries have deployed surveillance devices in recent years. These countries represent a range of political systems, and the intended purposes of the surveillance systems vary. Nonetheless, these technologies present challenges to democratic norms and practices. Specifically, activists and digital rights organizations have raised concerns over privacy. The introduction of these technologies without institutional checks and balances renders citizens more vulnerable to political surveillance and suppression.

The growing accessibility of monitoring products in Africa has been made possible by the sales of foreign technology supported by soft loans, primarily from China. In addition to Huawei and other Chinese firms, which have built roughly 70 percent of the 4G network infrastructure on the continent, private cybersecurity and surveillance firms from Israel, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, among others, have also been active in Africa.

“Remote-control hacking” is another form of surveillance technology that is spreading across the continent. These surveillance systems enable governments to access files on targeted laptops. They also log keystrokes and passwords as a means to turn on webcams and microphones.

“The growing accessibility of monitoring products in Africa has been made possible by the sales of foreign technology supported by soft loans, primarily from China.”

Eavesdropping is another surveillance technique that allows governments to access calls, texts, and the locations of phones around the world. This technique, most closely linked to the Bulgarian-based surveillance firm Circles, an affiliate of the NSO Group, which developed the infamous Pegasus software, provides spyware technology to countries as a means to exploit faults in telecom systems. Several governments in African countries, such as Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, are reportedly using these systems to connect to their local telecommunications companies’ infrastructure to conduct surveillance.

The adoption of surveillance products in Africa is closely linked to Huawei’s Safe Cities projects. The Safe Cities concept makes use of a range of interconnected tracking devices, video cameras, software, and cloud storage systems to tap public and private platforms in a more cohesive manner to enhance public goals such as policing, managing traffic, and streamlining administrative services. Access to this web of systems ostensibly increases the visibility of police officers who can then agilely track and respond to crime in real time.

There is no robust evidence linking the adoption of surveillance technology and a decrease in crime in Africa. However, the spread of surveillance technologies in Africa does thrust the continent into a critical inflection point, torn between the increased capability to monitor citizens through widely available digital products and protections for democratic norms and practices. This is happening without much public debate due to an underappreciation of the implications.

What We Have Learned about the Use of Surveillance Technology in Africa

A street in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

A street in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (Photo: Nebiyu.s)

Ethiopia’s approach to ICT investment is informative. With the help of Beijing, Ethiopia has championed the use of ICT technologies as an instrument to strengthen its local administrative capacity. For example, the Woredanet project digitally connects ministers in Addis Ababa with the country’s 950 district administrations (woredas), nine regions, and two city administrations.

This growing ICT capacity for local governments is tempered by Ethiopia’s poor record of internet freedom. Its online environment remains encumbered by regular internet shutdowns, which are motivated by political objectives. This suggests that the implementation of surveillance technologies is vulnerable to being abused. This vulnerability is compounded by Ethiopia’s lack of a comprehensive legal instrument to regulate privacy and data protection measures.

Ethiopia is not an outlier. Half of the countries in Africa do not have laws on data protection. Promoting national cybersecurity policies for the expanding use of digital surveillance devices is therefore an essential step toward advancing digital rights.

Huawei’s 2018 annual report maintained that its Safe Cities project serves over 100 countries.  Huawei’s first African Safe City system  connected 1,800 high-definition cameras and 200 high-definition traffic surveillance infrastructures across Nairobi. Additionally, a national police command center was established to provide support to over 9,000 police officers and 195 police stations. These technologies aim to support crime prevention, as well as  accelerate response and recovery.

“In which contexts are these surveillance tools being utilized to enhance the public good versus primarily to advance the repressive capacity of those in power?”

The benefits of the Safe City project are hard to verify and appear exaggerated. According to Huawei, crime rates from 2014 to 2015 decreased by 46 percent in areas supported by their technologies in Kenya. Yet, Kenya’s National Police Service reports indicate smaller reductions in crime during those years. Nairobi and Mombasa, the two cities with the surveillance technologies, have also seen increases in reported crimes in 2017 and 2018.

While Huawei’s Safe Cities model may provide a template, it is important to recognize that these governance and surveillance systems are being installed at the request of African governments. The relevant question, then, is to determine in which contexts are these surveillance tools being utilized to enhance the public good versus primarily to advance the repressive capacity of those in power. Given the diversity of African governments that have adopted the surveillance technology, answering this question must be determined on a country-by-country basis. This, in turn, will support reform strategies and illustrate the viability of locally driven policy solutions.

Priorities for Addressing the Misuse of Surveillance Technology

The impulse for governments to control information in a society and surveil citizens has always existed. In fact, this has been the focus of many African intelligence services over the years. The adoption of new surveillance technology in Africa, however, has dramatically empowered governments to do so—and at a scale not previously seen. What may have taken a whole army of operatives to do in the past can now be accomplished by a few engineers.

Building on country-level reform strategies and best practices, African legislators and digital rights advocacy groups can strengthen norms and regulations surrounding surveillance technology by establishing AU advisory panels to lay out recommendations. The African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protectionwas established in 2014 to provide a framework for cybersecurity in Africa. As part of this, member states are asked to establish national cybersecurity policies as well as legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks for cybersecurity governance. Yet, the Convention requires the ratification of 15 countries to take effect. Thus far, only five countries (Namibia, Senegal, Ghana, Guinea, and Mauritius) have done so.

Row of surveillance cameras

The absence of a clear regulatory framework leaves many African countries vulnerable to misuse of surveillance technologies. While individual countries must continue to work toward domestically driven policy solutions, facilitating a shared understanding of regulatory approaches to these devices can accelerate the means to confront common concerns and illegitimate uses. By taking advantage of already established frameworks, these advisory panels can provide the necessary counsel on whether appropriate checks and balances are in place.

A common regulatory approach also has value given the increasing interconnectedness of information communication technology systems across nations. Additionally, many African countries lack the capacity in terms of expert personnel to facilitate the development and implementation of cybersecurity policy and regulatory frameworks. A common regulatory approach offers a collection of tools, policies, and guidelines that can enable local actors to more quickly protect their respective cyber environments.

“The absence of a clear regulatory framework leaves many African countries vulnerable to misuse of surveillance technologies.”

Tapping available training content and programs consistent with domestic realities can support digital rights advocates and other stakeholders with essential facts and frameworks to engage constructively with the demands of digital rights and security concerns. Promoting cyber stability and increasing awareness of cybersecurity governance in Africa, moreover, helps support the establishment of enforcement mechanisms and the development of institutional capacities. International actors can also work with local African civil society organizations to strengthen checks and balances and address concerns over privacy. By supporting digital rights initiatives, international actors can empower and scale the work of local organizations.

African citizens are facing a digital inflection point. There is an urgent need to understand and strengthen the means of protecting digital rights as part of the broader array of civil liberties and political rights. To advance these goals, training, best practices, advisory panels, and conferences that include digital advocacy groups, policymakers, security professionals, and citizens can accelerate the learning curve on these issues and find policy solutions that ensure freedom while paying critical attention to security demands.

Bulelani Jili is a Ph.D. student at Harvard University’s Department of African and African American Studies and a former Yenching Scholar at Peking University.

 

This article has originally appeared on the portal for Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

    

Members of the Africa Diaspora Forum (ADF), civil society organisations, churches, trade unions and other coalitions wear chains and shout slogans during a demonstration against the slave trade and human trafficking in Libya on December 12, 2017 at the Union Buildings in Pretoria. The UN Security Council on December 7 said reports that migrants detained in Libyan camps were being sold into slavery could amount to "crimes against humanity" in a joint statement of condemnation.
Members of the Africa Diaspora Forum and civil society organizations protest against human trafficking and slavery in Libya in December 2017 in Pretoria, South Africa. (Photo via AFP)

Ninety-six Ugandan women, mostly children and youth, were stopped at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi in January en route to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for work opportunities. The girls, who lacked proper employment papers, were victims of a well-established human trafficking ring in East Africa, headquartered in Kenya and operating under the guise of employment agencies.

This wasn’t the first such interception. Almost every month, Kenya’s Directorate of Criminal Investigations reports at least one interception involving victims not only from Uganda but also from Burundi, Rwanda, and to a lesser extent Tanzania. Most of East Africa’s trafficking takes place in and through Kenya.

 

Human trafficking routes from East Africa to the Middle East

Human trafficking routes from East Africa to the Middle East

 

The Trafficking Value Chain

Traditionally, the value chain of this criminal network has comprised three links. First are regionally based recruitment brokers who ferry people from their respective countries to Kenya. Second are the Kenyan-based links who “receive” the people and act as the country’s employment agencies. They move victims from Kenya to the host country. Third are the counterparts who often pose as foreign employment agencies. They are stationed in the host country and “receive” people sent from Kenya.

Recent cases and new research by the ENACT organized crime project suggest a shift in the workings of the trafficking value chain as far as the third “link” is concerned. There is evidence that the trafficking of women and girls from East Africa to the Middle East is now being carried out entirely by East Africans.

Interviews with victims revealed that they were received in the foreign country by “familiar faces”. In February 2020, fifty Kenyans, each of whom paid about US$2,000 to supposed employment agencies, were trafficked to the UAE and enslaved in a house by a “Mombasa agent” who has operations in Mombasa and Dubai. The victims said there were many such trafficking houses run by Kenyans in Dubai, housing other East African nationals such as Ugandans and Tanzanians. Most of East Africa’s trafficking takes place in and through Kenya.

A specific case revealed to Lucia Bird, senior analyst at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, highlights the multinational and regional interconnections. A Ugandan girl was trafficked to Kenya by a Ugandan family friend. A Kenyan national then flew with her to Oman, where she was collected at the airport by an Ethiopian national before being driven to her Omani employers.

Similarly, Angelo Izama, a human trafficking consultant who volunteers on a project for trafficked victims at a church in the UAE, told ENACT of a Ugandan girl recruited to be a receptionist. She was received by a Ugandan in Dubai and forced into sex work.

 

Regional trafficking networks appear to want to control the entire value chain

 

While the links in a criminal value chain work together, there is also competition, with operators vying for a greater share of the more profitable elements in the chain. Regional trafficking networks appear to want to control the entire value chain, from sourcing to recruiting victims, trafficking them out of East Africa and receiving them in the foreign country. This well-coordinated and continually shifting transnational crime process is difficult to police and prosecute.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a police officer specializing in human trafficking in East Africa told ENACT that the problem has engulfed the region. This affirms a 2018 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assessment report that shows an increase in human trafficking in East African countries.

The officer also notes that policing the crime is becoming more difficult. As an example, the officer referred to a joint initiative in 2017 between the Kenyan and Ugandan governments that appeared promising in its anti-trafficking measures. It failed, however, due to a lack of proper intelligence on the criminal value chain and inconsistent engagement between the two countries.

 

Better Migration Management

Regulating the labor exporting sector is also complicated. As with Kenya, Uganda imposed a ban on labor emigration to the Middle East in 2016, and then lifted it a year later. Ugandan civil society organizations working to counter human trafficking said the ban and its lifting had little impact on trafficking dynamics. They questioned the benefits of exporting labor and highlighted the failure to safeguard those undertaking labor migration.

Regional bodies such as the International Organization for Migration, UNODC, and the European Union have often called for a stronger regional approach to trafficking. The latest is the Better Migration Management program, which advocates for the prevention, protection, and prosecution of human trafficking in East Africa and the Horn of Africa.

East African countries appear to lack power in negotiations with Middle Eastern countries on trafficking issues. This is because of gaps in their domestic legislation and regional trafficking strategies. Yet other regions that export labor to the Middle East have shown that this can be done.

The Philippines, for example, has twenty-three bilateral agreements with seven countries, most of which are in the Middle East. This allows authorities to oversee the protection and safety of workers and prevent them being exploited by trafficking networks and employers in destination countries. The labor export sector makes up a significant portion of the Philippines’ gross domestic product, yet it also comes with challenges and is not an economic cure-all.

East Africa needs to learn from approaches elsewhere that prevent trafficking and protect workers. Until more robust responses are in place, trafficking and exploitation are likely to grow in the region. This perpetuates the vulnerability of poor women and girls, and undermines the prospects of labor exportation as a livelihoods option.

 

Mohamed Daghar is a researcher with the ENACT project in Nairobi.

This article was first published by the ENACT project. ENACT is funded by the European Union (EU). The content of this article is the sole responsibility of the author and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the EU.

 

Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba
Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba

Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, one of Africa’s foremost philosophers, civil rights activists, and pro-democracy scholars, passed away at the University Clinic of Kinshasa on Wednesday, July 15.

Wamba dia Wamba obtained his education in the United States after earning a scholarship through the African-American Institute, studying at Western Michigan University before earning his MBA at Claremont University. He taught at Brandeis and Harvard universities while in the United States, where he met his wife and got involved in the civil rights movement through the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.

 

He became a history professor at the University of Dar es Salaam

 

He moved Tanzania and became a history professor at the University of Dar es Salaam, which had become an intellectual nexus of Pan-African thought. He founded the university’s philosophy club, and from 1992 to 1995 he served as the president of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA).

In 1998, Wamba dia Wamba founded the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) with the support of Uganda and Rwanda, and began a campaign against newly installed DRC president Laurent-Désiré Kabila. In August, the RCD launched an attack on Goma, starting the Second Congo War. The RCD later split into two factions, supported by the two rival neighboring countries, after which Wamba dia Wamba faced revolt in his own faction.

After the war, Wamba dia Wamba became a senator in the DRC government and helped to draft a new constitution. He continued to write and was a noted political theorist. More recently, in May 2017, he was appointed president of the political-religious movement Bundu dia Mayala.

 

 

Nyege Nyege
A photo taken on September 5, 2017, of a stage at the annual Nyege Nyege International Music Festival in Jinja, Uganda. (Ian Duncan Kacungira/AFP)

Thanks to support from the Nyege Nyege arts collective, African women have fast become an influential force in the country’s electronic music scene. Based in Kampala, Uganda, Nyege Nyege also has two record labels and community studios that offer a place for female musicians from Uganda and other East African countries to record their music. An artist residency is offered to musicians ranging from novices figuring out their own sound to those who want to finalize recording and mastering full-length tracks.

Co-founded by Derek Debru, a Belgian, and Arlen Dilsizian, a Greek-Armenian, Nyege Nyege has also put on a festival every year since 2015. It not only provides international exposure for African musicians but also serves as a safe space to elevate marginalized members of the LGBTQ community, who are integral to the development of electronic music but who face political and social exclusion, especially in Uganda.

 

Nyege Nyege still plans on holding this year’s festival

 

In May, the label was invited to take part in a series of streamed concerts titled “Nyege Nyege, A New Hope” broadcast by the Museum of Art, Architecture and Technology in Lisbon, Portugal, in celebration of International Museum Day.

Despite the restrictions imposed because of COVID-19, Nyege Nyege still plans on holding this year’s festival in Jinja, Uganda, from September 3 to 6, with significantly reduced physical capacity and a livestream.

 

LGBTQ Uganda
Members of the LGBTQ community take part in a Transgender Day of Remembrance vigil to pay tribute to victims of hate crimes in Kampala, Uganda, on November 23, 2019.

In mid-March, the United Nations’ International Organization for Migration (IOM) suspended all resettlements of refugees and displaced peoples due to COVID-19, leaving thousands stranded in countries that were only supposed to be throughways to their final destination.

For many, the added months aren’t too much of a burden, having spent years waiting for their resettlement applications to be processed after waiting long stretches in refugee camps. But in Kenya, hundreds of LGBTQ refugees fleeing homophobic persecution from neighboring Uganda are now stuck in a torturous limbo, under a constant threat of being deported or unable to support themselves as they wait for flights to resume.

 

It's a holdover from British colonial-era laws reinforced by homegrown evangelical Christian movements 

 

Homosexuality is still considered a criminal offense in both Kenya and Uganda, a holdover from British colonial-era laws reinforced by homegrown evangelical Christian movements. While LGBTQ people face police harassment and the threat of imprisonment in Kenya, it pales in comparison to the aggressive homophobia that characterizes Ugandan political and civil life.

Lydia Boyd, an anthropologists studying Ugandan attitudes towards homosexuality, has observed that the animosity is characterized by a belief that non-hetero sexual identities are an imposition by Western influences, at odds with Ugandan culture and familial bonds that are central to social networks. In recent months, LGBTQ activists have faced threats of violence, one being murdered in his own home, while others have been arrested on suspicion of homosexuality alone.

Rumors began to spread in late 2019 that Uganda was looking to reintroduce an anti-homosexuality bill from 2013, whose original draft included the death penalty for violators but was changed to life imprisonment. Though it was passed by President Yoweri Museveni, it was ultimately overturned by the constitutional court over legal technicalities, following months of international condemnation.

 

 

DRC army
Soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) confront members of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Opira, North Kivu.

On Sunday, May 24, at least seven villagers were killed in their homes and others were reportedly kidnapped in the DRC’s North Kivu province in an attack attributed to the Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Members of the ADF settled in the forests along the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s eastern border following their expulsion by Ugandan forces in the mid-1990s. They were tolerated by the locals until about six years ago, when they began to attack civilians and raze villages. They frequently target military bases in order to steal weapons and ammunition before retreating into the forest, where local farming operations help them stay active despite no known source of formal funding.

 

Secretive Jihadist Group

This latest attack casts further doubt on the efficacy of a Congolese military operation launched in October 2019 to dislodge the ADF from the Beni region in North Kivu province. The DRC’s armed forces, FARDC, did succeed in pushing rebels out of their stronghold while also establishing a permanent presence in the region, yet ADF fighters have continued to attack civilians, killing an estimated 1,000 people in four months after the start of the operation.

Of the numerous armed groups operating in this region of the DRC, the ADF has remained one of the most elusive and least understood players in the region. Though initially formed to remove Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni from power and largely led by Ugandans, the ADF has spent most of its existence in the DRC, embedding itself in local power structures to encourage recruitment. Propaganda from the group suggests it is trying to establish ties with international jihadist groups such as Islamic State with the intent of creating a local caliphate.

 

Ayak Veronica walks the catwalk at the 2018 Kampala Fashion Week. Photo by Alim Karmali
A model presents a creation by Uganda’s Bold in Africa collection at Kampala Fashion Week 2019, the annual showcase of fashion brands from East Africa in Kampala, Uganda. (Sumy Sadurni/AFP)


The fashion industry’s global supply chain has broken down due to COVID-19. Some 100,000 stores will probably close in the United States by fiscal 2025, with apparel retailers the hardest hit at 24,000 closures. The famous department store Neiman Marcus is expected to file for bankruptcy protection sometime this week.

The global health pandemic is not solely to blame for these failures, however. The reasons are deeper. When a US$10 shirt at H&M and a US$1,000 shirt from Hermès are made in the same factory, if not by the same hands, in an emerging market, then global fashion has a problem. The shift to fast fashion has overtaken our ability to adapt to a sustainable model.

For the future of sustainability, let us turn to Africa. The continent  has the youngest population in the world—an estimated 60 percent of the continent’s 1.3 billion people are under the age of twenty-five, and a fast growing middle class, yet the fashion world tends to treat Africans merely as consumers of second-hand clothing from the developed world, and thus are excluded from conversations about the future of fashion.

In solving this problem, some of Africa’s traditional sustainable fashion practices could play a role. The continent’s cultural heritage—like bark cloth manufacturing in Uganda, woven textiles from Nigeria and Ghana, traditional Berber weaving in North Africa, and beadwork from Maasai and Ndebele artisans—could play a central role in the revitalization of the fashion industry in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis.

 

A painting on barkcloth  Photo By Fred Kato Mutebi.
A painting on bark cloth. (Fred Kato Mutebi)

 

Looking to Tradition

Bark cloth, in particular, has been receiving renewed attention. Long worn by traditional faith healers and as a burial shroud, it is increasingly being revitalized for bespoke fashion. The whisky-colored cloth is made from pounding the fibrous inner bark of the Ficus natalensis tree, variously known as a Natal fig, mutuba, or omutoma tree. It is a laborious process, which may explain how bark cloth production began to decline after the introduction of cotton as an alternative textile by Arab traders in the 19th century. Yet it was once widely worn, and the cloth is more like leather than other plant-based textiles in durability.

Entrepreneurial Ugandans have already started to use the textile for anything from clothing to bedspreads and pillow covers.

“I have been to too many funerals of bark cloth makers in recent years,“ says Ugandan visual artist Fred Kato Mutebi," These artisans -- mostly men, leave this earth with nothing for their families to inherit but their mallets.

Mutebi often uses bark cloth as canvases for his artworks. He estimates there are less than a hundred artisans with the knowledge of making bark cloth left in Uganda. “We as artists, designers, and Ugandans must do more to protect this tradition and help it go global.”

A Ugandan bark cloth exhibition in Texas. Photo by Lesli Robertson
Ugandan bark cloth on display at the University of North Texas Art Gallery. (Lesli Robertson)

 

The Cloth for Royalty

Bark cloth is most closely associated with the people of two of Uganda’s traditional kingdoms, Tooro and Buganda. The Kingdom of Tooro, in particular, is seeking to develop its bark cloth industry. The Queen mother, HRH Best Kemigisa, has advocated for the planting of trees used to produce bark cloth, saying it will not only provide jobs but also serve to help mitigate the impacts of climate change.

Her son, HRH King Oyo Rukidi IV, is currently championing a new initiative that will create jobs centered on the Tooro cultural heritage of bark cloth manufacturing.

"The Omutoma tree that Barkcloth comes from has been with man since the beginning of time and used as a shroud, for fashion, a fire preserver, a blanket, used in spiritual rituals and we intend on continuing the heritage into the future," said Hon. Peter Apuuli Rusoke, the Minister of Culture of the kingdom of Tooro.

Surely some of Africa’s other indigenous fashion traditions can similarly be promoted at this time. Now is the time to develop collaborative opportunities to ensure the future of such traditions, from Uganda to South Africa to Morocco.

 

Camilla Barungi is a Ugandan-born, New York-based model, entrepreneur, and social innovator with a special interest in African sustainability, fashion, emerging technologies, and film. (Twitter: @camillabarungi)

 

Regional governmental organizations in Africa have a mixed history. Some like ECOWAS in West Africa have been able to facilitate collective action and drive change in the region, while others like the Maghreb Union in North Africa lay dormant. Somewhere in between is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, better known as IGAD. It was established in 1996 as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, created in 1986. IGAD includes eight countries from the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley, and the Great Lakes Region—Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda—and has its headquarters in Djibouti City. Its mandate includes development with a focus on peace and security. 

In the long-term IGAD and the EAC may merge but, the two blocks have very different origins. The East African Community (EAC) started as a trade bloc, there was a custom union between Uganda and Kenya even before independence, then Tanganyika (comprising the mainland of present-day Tanzania) joined in 1927, the union of East Africa collapsed in 1977 and then was revived in 2000, while IGAD did not start as a trading bloc and is still behind EAC in economic integration. 

 

Don't Wait for Peace to Pursue Development

Some civil society leaders have wondered aloud if IGAD is putting the cart before the horse, and whether there shouldn’t be greater emphasis on solving the region's many conflicts before working on regional integration, let alone establishing economic corridors, which may run through conflict zones.

In 2019, I wrote an article criticizing IGAD and suggesting that its endless search for peace was a trap, because “sustainable peace objectives with high standards of security and stability” were the bait that entices stakeholders to ignore the need for private sector development and regional economic integration. My article “IGAD and Peace Trap” focused on the IGAD peace-for-development approach. 

To be clear, IGAD's peace building efforts in South Sudan and Somalia have been successes. IGAD led the negotiations that achieved independence of South Sudan. After a new wave of the civil war in South Sudan beginning in 2013, IGAD launched a mediation effort which helped the two parties of the conflict reach several peace agreements. Of theses the 2018 Khartoum agreement was the final and most decisive one.  

In Somalia, IGAD led efforts led to the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) in March 2005, approved by the AU in September 2006, then approved by the United Nations Security Council in December 2006. The current African Union Mission in Somalia AMISOM replaced IGASOM.

Still, we should build on available conditions, and let people and local communities push the process of accomplishing peace forward through economic development. Hopefully, this third foundation of IGAD will witness the balance between peace and development.

 

Cattle Uganda
Cattle share the road with traffic in Uganda. Underdeveloped roads are a major impediment to development on the continent. (Yasuyoshi Chiba/AFP)

 

IGAD Regional Infrastructure Master Plan

The development of the IGAD Regional Infrastructure Master Plan (IRIMP) is ongoing and offers a new foundation for IGAD. It focuses on the development of major economic development corridors (EDCs) that cross borders, and the integrated policies and laws to support them. If implemented by 2040, as envisioned, it will offer a clear move away from the protectionism that has characterized the region for far too long.

In March 2020, the first forum for IRIMP consultative dialogue was held in Entebbe, Uganda. I was the chair of that forum. This consultative meeting was meant to engage with civil society leaders interested in the development of IGAD generally and the IRIMP specifically.

Elsadig Abdalla, IGAD director for economic & regional integration, said the Entebbe dialogue provided valuable inputs that would enhance the IRIMP for more effective implementation. He emphasized that all IGAD members were actively involved in infrastructure: “Ahead of the implementation of IRIMP, to date, member states have invested nearly US$20 billion in infrastructure development alone.” The Entebbe dialogue witnessed broad participation from NGOs and the private sector drawn from seven IGAD states with the notable exception of Eritrea. 

 

From a Master Plan to an Action Plan

In April 2018, IGAD signed a contract for the development of the IRIMP with consulting firms IPE Global Limited and Africon Universal Consulting in Nairobi, Kenya. The development of this master plan—with the support of the African Development Bank—is a vital step toward achieving economic integration in the IGAD region and to contribute to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) goals of streamlined trade in goods and services.

 

“The economic corridor approach transforms transport corridors into engines of socio-economic development.”

 

“Corridor approaches to economic development have increasingly informed strategy and plans in Africa over the past ten to fifteen years; the latest AU thinking continues to refine and further develop this approach,” said Jamie Simpson, executive director at IPE Global, in a conversation with the author at the IGAD event in Entebbe.

Simpson confirmed that projects in the areas of energy and transport have been identified as priorities in the master plan. These projects are estimated to cost between US$6 billion and US$10 billion, which will be invested in a phased manner. 

IGAD’s interest in the development of EDCs builds on well-established research in Africa over the past decade. An Africa Development Bank report on developing economic corridors, makes a compelling case for the role of EDCs. “The economic corridor approach transforms transport corridors into engines of socio-economic development”, the report reads. It suggests that local plans for linking the geographical surroundings of each member country should be made in line with the corresponding EDC plan.

A crucial point made in the report is about the role of the private sector in the development of these corridors: This partnership should start in the planning phase and continue through construction. A list of existing African transport corridors prepared by EENI Global Business School contains nineteen corridors. The map shows how corridors became new rivers of development on the continent.

As far as regional blocs in Africa are concerned, IGAD began as development regional institutional and eventually assumed security roles. With the IRIMP the organization can fulfill one the most pressing needs of East Africa and be a model for others to follow. 

 

Mekki Elmograbi chaired the first ever IRIMP consultative dialogue for IGAD in Entebbe, Uganda in March 2020. Elmograbi is a former Sudanese diplomat and is currently the head of the independent think tank Mekki Center.

As the worst locust infestation East Africa has seen since the 1970s continues to wreak havoc, the United Nations has warned that a second, significantly larger swarm originating in Somalia poses a grave threat to food security for millions of Africans.

 

Consuming the Food of 3.5 Million People in a Day

At the end of February, swarms were already devastating crops in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and continued to spread to Tanzania, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A swarm of desert locusts typically can occupy 100 square kilometres, and it’s estimated a swarm this size could consume crops in a day that would feed 3.5 million people.

 

A community volunteer uses a motorised spray to disperse pesticide on February 25, 2020 at a hatch site near Isiolo town in Isiolo county, eastern Kenya, where locust nymphs have hatched en masse. Millions of locust nymphs have emerged from eggs left behind by swarms that invaded the region last month and the situation remains extremely alarming in the Horn of Africa, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) specifically Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia where widespread breeding last month is now giving rise to new swarms. TONY KARUMBA / AFP
A community volunteer uses a motorised sprayer to disperse pesticide on February 25, 2020, at a hatch site near Isiolo, eastern Kenya, where locust nymphs have hatched en masse. Millions of locust nymphs have emerged from eggs left behind by swarms that invaded the region last month. The situation remains extremely alarming in the Horn of Africa, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), specifically in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, where widespread breeding last month is now giving rise to new swarms. (Tony Karumba / AFP)

 

Combating the locust spread was already proving a monumental challenge before COVID-19 led to the implementation of restrictions that have hampered the infestation response. Even with satellite technology to better track and optimize what limited resources African governments and volunteers have at their disposal, the effects of climate change have created prime breeding conditions for the locusts.

 

The Second Wave Could Be Twenty Times Worse

The second wave is expected to be twenty times worse than the first, posing a serious threat to food security as the voracious young adults seek out newly planted crops. Many smaller farmers depend on foreign aid to supplement their income, aid that is now threatened as international efforts are focused on the COVID-19 response.

In a public address delivered on Saturday, March 21, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni ordered a 30-day closure of all border entry and exit points in an effort to contain the spread of COVID-19. Total confirmed cases in Uganda have reached fourteen now. All passenger flights into Uganda are banned, save for emergencies. Exceptions have also been made for cargo planes and UN planes involved in emergency and relief work.

Several other African countries have instituted similar measures. Yet Uganda has also taken the step of closing down its refugee transit and reception centers as well. Uganda has maintained a relatively open refugee policy for years, hosting 1.4 million displaced people, most of whom fled conflict from neighboring South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. President Museveni’s decision on this matter treads a fine line between retaining a commitment to protect refugees and mitigate COVID-19 infections and deaths. Many of the refugee camps are already overcrowded and lack sufficient numbers of intensive care units and ventilators.

 

Why It Matters

Uganda’s radical measures reflect the difficult decisions national governments must make in terms of protecting life: do they prioritize their citizens, or strive to address the needs of refugees as well? In most situations, refugees end up on the losing end of these questions, as few politicians are willing to risk their careers defending people who are not their constituents. This also means that refugees can become scapegoats for government failings when managing crises like a viral pandemic. Uganda’s decision makes practical sense, as healthcare systems the world over struggle to provide enough equipment to diagnose and treat infected patients, so allowing more potential carriers into the country is a risk that would most likely exacerbate the situation. Nonetheless, Uganda should take steps to collaborate with its regional partners to support refugees in order to prevent COVID-19 from taking hold in such a vulnerable population, while also ensuring they do not become the victim of crisis-induced panic.

 

https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2020/03/25/uganda-coronavirus-refugees-asylum-seekers

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