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Trump has never been to Africa. At least not as president. Not for six decades, since JFK, has an American president even met with fewer African leaders than Trump. During JFK's time of course most African states were still colonial territories. His attitude toward the continent appears to be mired in either indifference or outright hostility, as his “shithole countries” comment and repeated (but unsuccessful) efforts to cut foreign aid demonstrate.

The feeling is mutual. As with the rest of the world, Africa’s view of the United States has declined under Trump’s leadership.

Yet, as more astute observers than the President recognise, this is exactly the moment to care about Africa. According to the UN, Sub-Saharan Africa is the only global region expected to sustain rapid population growth over the course of this century. By 2050, Nigeria will overtake the U.S. as the third most populous country in the world. The spill over effects of recent crises – such as piracy in the Gulf of Aden or the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean – demonstrate that Africa is an important geopolitical theatre with growing clout. America’s rivals, particularly China and increasingly Russia, recognise this and have seized the initiative, exposing U.S. policy as shallow and out of touch.

With the prospect of a new administration on the horizon, the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a series of debates with expert contributors from both the U.S. and Africa. The key critiques and recommendations are summarised in a proposed New U.S. Policy Framework for the African Century.

The framework is built on three key pillars: real partnerships, new partners, and revitalising public diplomacy. The key elements of these pillars are presented below.

Real Partnerships

The report argues that U.S. policymakers do not give Africa the same careful strategic consideration as other conglomerated regions around the world, such as Latin America and the Middle East. The U.S. needs to take its relationships on the continent more seriously.

That begins with undoing Henry Kissinger’s 1974 division of the continent into two separately imagined sub-regions – North and Sub-Saharan – and approaching Africa as a united whole. By standardising the scope of African affairs across all its foreign policy organisms – from the State Department to USAID, the Pentagon and beyond – the U.S. could consolidate the actual number of policymakers and potentially achieve greater focus in its policymaking. Indeed, more voices rarely add greater clarity to a discussion.

With a re-imagined African continent, the U.S. president and his top officials should engage more directly to influence policy outcomes. Instead of waiting at the finish line to shake the hands of pliant leaders, the president should be more of an active “problem solver” on the continent. This engagement should be supported with more meaningful policy tools – “real carrots and sticks” – to sway these outcomes.

New Partners

Africa’s transformation will require a new paradigm of relationships – both within the continent and externally – to help the U.S. achieve its strategic aims.

According to the UN, by 2050, Africa will be home to fourteen megacities spread right across the continent: including in Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Angola, DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and South Africa. These cities will be engines of economic growth and centres of political power which the U.S. should leverage to diversify its existing partnerships and increase economic ties.

And with the growing global trend of regionalism, the U.S. needs to boost its engagement with Africa’s plethora of regional bodies, including SADC, COMESA, ECOWAS and ECCAS. This could include deploying personnel to work with these institutions and providing financial assistance.

In terms of external partners, the U.S. should look beyond France and the UK when engaging international partners to help fulfil its aims on the continent. And at home, U.S. companies require more hand-holding and strategic direction to increase foreign direct investment into Africa, particularly in the agribusiness, energy, entertainment, finance, services, and technology sectors.


African popular culture is vibrant, politically engaged, and growing in global influence. From the Afrocentric iconography of international blockbusters like Black Panther and the Lion King to the Afrobeat superstars topping charts around the world. Yet, the U.S. persists with old-school communication strategies and public diplomacy initiatives like the “Jazz Ambassadors” programme first established in the 1950s, when Louis Armstrong was sent on a tour through the continent. Now, as then, the U.S. needs to leverage its most popular African American stars to rebuild its positive image on the continent.

However, that also requires an honest dialogue about American society’s persistent challenge with racism. These issues matter to Africans and the U.S. needs to do more to understand and influence these sentiments through programmes like the Young African Leaders Initiative, established by President Obama in 2010.


CSIS’ framework presents an optimistic and progressive agenda for future U.S.-Africa relations. An agenda which, frankly, seems unobtainable with the ideology and tendencies of the current administration. Trump has never demonstrated the intellectual sophistication to suggest he might grasp Africa’s growing strategic importance and involve himself more directly in its affairs, as he does with China, for example. 

The administration’s open disavowal of multilateralism suggests that it would be unlikely to build new coalitions to address the challenges facing Africa. Furthermore, its antagonistic relationship with its own (predominantly Democrat-controlled) megacities and the steady hollowing out of State Department capacity, provides little hope for innovative approaches to engagement on the continent. Never mind Trump’s unprecedented racial divisiveness.

The prospect of a Joe Biden presidency looms ever more likely and with greater promise for a revitalised American foreign policy. Yet, it would be naïve to imagine that Africa would be among his priorities. The relationship with China requires a serious strategic re-set; America will need to reingratiate itself with multilateral platforms such as NATO and the Paris Agreement; and Russian interference in the Middle East and Europe will persist.

However, with Vice President Harris and Susan Rice as a potential Secretary of State, the Biden administration would be well placed to rebuild good will and engage its most senior representatives with African affairs. Similarly, high profile African Americans would likely be more inclined to represent their country under Biden’s leadership.

The U.S. presidential election is never a parochial affair. Africa’s leaders, like those around the world, will be watching closely in November.

A full copy of the CSIS report is available here.

miner zimb
A sign at a Zimbabwean mine makes it clear that firearms are not allowed. (Photo via AFP)

Two Zimbabwean workers at a gold mine on the outskirts of Gweru in central Zimbabwe were shot by their Chinese boss on Sunday, June 21. The incident has rekindled long-standing tensions about Chinese nationals living in the southern African country.

A court affidavit submitted by the Zimbabwean police alleges that Zhang Xuelin shot Kenneth Tachiona five times, reportedly in both thighs, and another employee, Wendy Chikwaira, had his chin grazed by a bullet. Workers at Reden Mine in Gweru had confronted Xuelin over his alleged failure to pay their wages in US dollars, as had been agreed previously, according to the affidavit. US dollars are highly sought-after in Zimbabwe, which has experienced repeated cash shortages and inflation spikes since its currency was effectively abandoned in 2009.

The Gweru case brings to mind a 2010 shooting in neighboring Zambia. Two Chinese mine managers were charged with the attempted murder of eleven workers at the Chinese-owned Collum Coal Mine in Sinazongwe after a protest over pay and conditions became heated. Despite being a decade apart, the two cases demonstrate an ongoing pattern of African workers feeling disgruntled by the systemic imbalance of their relationship with Chinese interests.



The number of Chinese nationals in Africa has increased over the past two decades. At least 10,000 Chinese nationals now live and work in Zimbabwe, according to the Brookings Institute. The population in Zambia is significantly higher. Many of these migrants are employed as contractors for Chinese companies delivering extensive infrastructure, construction, manufacturing, and mining projects. This model of investment frustrates African executives, commentators, and workers, who argue that it deprives locals of employment and training opportunities. There is, however, evidence to suggest that Chinese firms employ, pay, and train Africans at similar rates as non-Chinese companies.

That sentiment reflects more deep-seated misgivings about the equity of large deals that African governments sign with Chinese companies. These include loans, construction projects, and extraction rights for natural resources. For example, in April 2019, Chinese firm Tsingshan committed to investing US$2 billion to mine chrome, iron ore, nickel, and coal in Zimbabwe, cementing China’s place as the country’s largest foreign investor. At the same time, Shanghai Construction Group is constructing a new US$140 million six-story parliament building, apparently a donation from the Chinese government. But many Zimbabweans are skeptical of such gestures. Few regard it as unadulterated altruism. And the lack of transparency fuels speculation.


Postcolonial Partnership?

China’s extensive leverage in Zimbabwe, and elsewhere, does not look like the postcolonial partnership promised in the 1970s. Indeed, the legacy of racist settler colonialism provides an alarming comparison for Zimbabweans when they hear stories of managers shooting employees or, as happened in Zambia recently, Chinese vendors denying service to black customers.

This is a particularly sensitive time for Sino-African relations. In April, reports of African migrants in Guangzhou, home to China’s largest African community, being targeted for forced testing and quarantine, evicted from their accommodation, and denied hospitality went viral and sparked outrage on social media. Human Rights Watch accused Guangdong authorities of “textbook” discrimination. Many feel that it is one rule for the Chinese in Africa and quite another for Africans in China.

The COVID-19 crisis has also elevated concerns about debt, at a time when economic paralysis is hampering governments’ ability to maintain payments. About 20 percent of African government external debt is owed to China. According to reports, China has offered relief from interest-free loans, but these loans make up less than 5 percent of its total lending.

In a recent interview, former Zimbabwean minister Gordon Moyo, now director of the country’s Public Policy and Research Institute, described China’s lending as “illegitimate” and said the East Asian country was at risk of being “a new imperialist.”


Money Matters

Having been shot repeatedly in both legs, Kenneth Tachiona faces the prospect of being disabled for the rest of his life. But with a wife and five children, his concerns are very pragmatic. In an interview with VOA, he said: “Of course I want the law to take its course, but I’m now disabled, and for me, the most important thing is to be compensated adequately.” Money being his most pressing concern reflects the same hard realities facing his government.

President Emmerson Mnangagwa has emphasized the importance of impartial justice in this case. Likewise, the Chinese embassy declared its respect for Zimbabwe’s right to handle the situation “in accordance with the law.” At the same time, however, they asked to see Zimbabwe “protect the safety as well as legitimate rights and interests” of Chinese nationals in the country. President Mnangagwa echoed the sentiment and did not accept the view that the shooting was reflective of “systemic and widespread” abuse by Chinese employers, as some prominent civil society groups have claimed.

With mounting debt, a health crisis, and uncertain support from the West, there is little prospect of Zimbabwe—or any of its neighbors—untangling itself from Chinese interests.


Jesse Samasuwo is a London-based analyst writing and researching international affairs, primarily focused on energy, trade, and politics.


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Jun 18, 2021